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High-stakes ranching quarrels are nothing new to Johnson County,
Wyoming. The so-called Johnson County War, a violent range dispute
from 1892, has captivated numerous filmmakers and novelists up until the
present day. 1 It seems fitting, therefore, that a ranch in Johnson County
recently became a symbolic battleground in the emerging conflict over land
preservation. 2 In Hicks v. Dowd, a Johnson County newspaperman named
Robb Hicks sued Fred and Linda Dowd, the current owners of a thousand-
acre ranch formerly known as Meadowood, because they tried to extinguish
a conservation easement the previous owner had effectively donated to a
charitable trust.3 The court dismissed the action brought by Hicks on the
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1. The episode "has found its way into western history in two archetypal forms: as a story of
cattle owners punishing lawless rustlers, and as a story of homesteaders defying the rich and powerful."
Daniel Belgrad, "Power's Larger Meaning": The Johnson County War as Political Violence in an
Environmental Context, 33 W. HIST. Q. 159, 159 (2002). For examples of the latter, see JACK
SCHAEFER, SHANE (1949); HEAVEN'S GATE (United Artists 1980); and JOHNSON COUNTY WAR (Hall-
mark Entertainment 2002). See generally BILL O'NEAL, THE JOHNSON COUNTY WAR 243-52 (2004)
(discussing the literary and artistic treatment of the episode over the years).
2. See Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo. 2007).
3. Id. at 915-17. Hicks also named the Board of Trustees of the "Scenic Preserve Trust," an
entity formed by Johnson County, as a defendant. Id. at 914-16. For media analysis of the case, see All
Things Considered: In Land Conservation, "Forever" May Not Last (NPR radio broadcast Mar. 11,
2008), available at http://www.shifting-ground.com/conservationeasements.html. Under certain
circumstances, the donation of a conservation easement can create a charitable trust, even if the term
"trust" is not expressly used. See UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT § 3 cmt. (1982); UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 414 cmt. (2000); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.11 cmt. b (2000); Alexan-
der R. Arpad, Private Transactions, Public Benefits, and Perpetual Control over the Use of Real Prop-
erty: Interpreting Conservation Easements as Charitable Trusts, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 91,
128-42 (2002); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Conservation Easements: Perpetuity and Beyond, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 673, 677-701 (2007). In Hicks, the former owner of Meadowood Ranch donated one acre of the
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ground that he lacked standing to enforce the charitable trust.4 Hicks v.
Dowd soon attracted attention from commentators, who have used it to
illustrate problems and issues relating to conservation easements. 5 In the
general context of trust law, however, Hicks is also notable for its attempt
to interpret section 405(c) of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC"), a rule that
has yet to find much elucidation in the courts of the states that have
adopted it.6
In a departure from traditional law, section 405(c) grants standing to
"[t]he settlor of a charitable trust, among others," to "maintain a proceeding
to enforce the trust."'7 The UTC provision thus presents an obvious ambigu-
ity: who are the "others" contemplated by the uniform act? The Hicks court
gave a simple but dubious answer to this question.8 In Wyoming, the court
held, "a charitable trust may be enforced by a settlor, the attorney general,
or a qualified beneficiary of the trust."9 Moreover, the court treated the
UTC term "qualified beneficiary" as "a term analogous to the common law
ranch along with a conservation easement to the Board of County Commissioners, which in turn quit-
claimed the one-acre parcel to the Scenic Preserve Trust, subject to the easement. 157 P.3d at 915-16.
4. Hicks, 157 P.3d at 923. After Hicks lost, the Wyoming Attorney General subsequently filed
his own lawsuit against the Dowds. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Salzburg v. Dowd, No. CV-2008-0079 (Wyo. 4th Dist. Ct. Aug. 18, 2009). The Attorney General's suit
was pending as this article was being edited for publication.
5. Compare C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Perpetuity?, 8 WYO. L. REV. 25,
62 (2008) (arguing that improper easement termination is not likely to be a "serious problem," and "the
existing remedies and disincentives are adequate, or at least have not yet proven inadequate, to deal
with the problem"), with Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, In Defense of Conservation
Easements: A Response to The End of Perpetuity, 9 Wyo. L. REV. 1, 95-96 (2009), (contending that
conservation easements donated as charitable gifts constitute restricted charitable gifts or charitable
trusts and cannot be terminated without court approval in a cy pres proceeding, and charitable trust
principles are the best means to hold grantees of conservation easements "accountable for actions taken
or not taken that are in violation of their fiduciary obligations").
6. Other cases attempting to construe the provision include Riley v. Pate, 3 So. 3d 835, 841 (Ala.
2008) (Bolin, J., concurring), and Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln Foundation, Inc., 91
P.3d 1019, 1028-29 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2004).
7. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2000) (emphasis added); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 94 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009) (including settlor among those with standing to enforce a
charitable trust). On the contrast with traditional law, see, for example, RONALD CHESTER, GEORGE
GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 415, at 65-69
(3d ed. 2005); Ronald Chester, Grantor Standing to Enforce Charitable Transfers Under Section 405(c)
of the Uniform Trust Code and Related Law: How Important Is it and How Extensive Should it Be?, 37
REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 611, 613-18 (2003); and Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Standing to Enforce
Trusts: Renewing and Expanding Professor Gaubatz's 1984 Discussion of Settlor Enforcement, 62 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 713, 724-25 (2008). Even before the promulgation of UTC § 405(c), however, courts
were willing to grant standing to the settlor of a charitable trust in some circumstances. See John T.
Gaubatz, Grantor Enforcement of Trusts: Standing in One Private Law Setting, 62 N.C. L. REV. 905,
921-27 (1984).
8. For criticism of the interpretation of the UTC in Hicks, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 94 cmt. g(l) reporter's note (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009) (stating that "the decision was based on a
strained interpretation (effectively abolishing special-interest standing) of 2006 legislation derived from
the Uniform Trust Code, which clearly calls for a different result").
9. Hicks, 157 P.3dat 921.
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concept of 'special interest."' 10 Thus, in the view of the Hicks court, UTC
§ 405(c) merely added the settlor of a charitable trust to the list of individu-
als who would already have standing to enforce it under traditional law.1 '
Even though the former Meadowood Ranch was subject to a charitable
trust, the court found that the plaintiff (who was a resident of Johnson
County, but not an adjacent landowner) had no interest in the trust distin-
guishable from that of the public at large, and thus lacked standing to en-
force it. 12
For decades, scholars have criticized the traditional notion that grant-
ing standing to a public official such as an attorney general provides an
adequate mechanism for monitoring charitable trusts. 13 As Jonathan Klick
and Robert Sitkoff demonstrated in their study of the Hershey Trust, politi-
cal considerations may limit the ability to improve, through increased fund-
ing and disclosure, the monitoring and enforcement of charitable trusts by
state attorneys general. 14 According to some, the practical problems of
charitable trust supervision justify the decision of the UTC drafters to ex-
tend standing to the settlor of a charitable trust.15 Professor Henry Hans-
10. Id. "Qualified beneficiary" is a defined term within the UTC, and the rights of qualified bene-
ficiaries are granted to certain charitable organizations "expressly designated to received distributions
under the terms of a charitable trust," as well as the attorney general or other official having power to
enforce it. See UTC §§ 103(13), 110 (2000); see also T.P. Gallanis, The Trustee's Duty to Inform, 85
N.C. L. REv. 1595, 1598-1605 (2007) (discussing different classifications of beneficiaries under UTC).
The drafters of the UTC, however, did not intend to abolish the common-law doctrine of special interest
standing. See UTC § 405 official cmt. ("The grant of standing to the settlor does not negate the right
of... persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or their interests."). Those who own land
adjacent to the property held under a conservation easement, for example, may have special interest
standing under certain circumstances. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94 cmt. g(l) reporter's
note (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009) (citing relevant cases).
11. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959) ("A suit can be maintained for the
enforcement of a charitable trust by the Attorney General or other public officer, or by a co-trustee, or
by a person who has a special interest in the enforcement of the charitable trust, but not by persons who
have no special interest or by the settlor or his heirs, personal representatives or next of kin.").
12. Hicks, 157 P.3d at 919, 921.
13. See, e.g., JAMES J. FISHMAN, THE FAITHLESS FIDUCIARY AND THE QUEST FOR CHARITABLE
ACCOUNTABILITY 1200-2005, at 273-79 (2007); Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and
Paternalism in State Charity Law Enforcement, 79 IND. L.J. 937, 946-50 (2004); Susan N. Gary, Regu-
lating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV.
593, 622-24 (1999); Iris J. Goodwin, Donor Standing To Enforce Charitable Gifts: Civil Society vs.
Donor Empowerment, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1136-39 (2005); Henry B. Hansmann, Reforming
Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 497, 600-01 (1981); Terri Lynn Helge, Policing the
Good Guys: Regulation of the Charitable Sector Through a Federal Charity Oversight Board, 19
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1 (2009); Jonathan Klick & Robert H. Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable
Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from Hershey's Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 816-19
(2008).
14. See Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 13, at 816-17; see also Brody, supra note 13, at 946 ("Politi-
cal cynics believe that 'A.G.' stands not for 'attorney general' but for 'aspiring governor."').
15. See Chester, supra note 7, at 614; see also Evelyn Brody, From the Dead Hand to the Living
Dead: The Conundrum of Charitable-Donor Standing, 41 GA. L. REV. 1183, 1213-16 (2007) (suggest-
ing that dissatisfaction with the result in Carl J. Herzog Foundation v. University of Bridgeport, 699
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manm made the case for donor standing several decades ago, and his argu-
ment is no less compelling today:
[I]t makes sense to deny standing to patrons only if the consequence
would be large numbers of spite suits, strike suits, or suits filed through
sheer idiocy-which are presumably what the courts and commentators
have in mind when they raise the specter of "harassing" litigation ....
Yet it appears extraordinarily unlikely that suits of this nature would ever
become a sufficiently significant problem to outweigh the benefits of
enlisting patrons into the enforcement effort.... [T]he real problem ap-
pears to lie in creating sufficient incentives to lead individuals to bring
suit rather than in creating roadblocks to hold them back. 16
By referring in vague terms to "others" who might also have an en-
forcement right, however, UTC § 405(c) raises additional questions. Can
anyone enforce the trust on the settlor's behalf after her death, and, if so,
who? Should enforcement rights be granted to the settlor's personal repre-
sentative, the settlor's heirs, or both? 17 And what about the question posed
by the title of this Article-should the settlor be permitted to assign her
enforcement rights to a third party? These questions are not easy to answer,
but courts are likely to face them in future cases as an increasing number of
jurisdictions recognize settlor standing. 18
In Hicks v. Dowd, the conservation easement over Meadowood Ranch
was donated by Paul Lowham, a previous owner of the property, acting
through the Lowham Limited Partnership.' 9 Even though they subsequently
sold Meadowood to the Dowds, Lowham and his partners should be treated
as settlors of the charitable trust created by the conveyance of the conserva-
A.2d 995 (Conn. 1997), a Connecticut case denying standing to a donor to enforce a charitable gift
under the Uniform Management of Institutional Funds Act, may have inspired the grant of settlor
standing in UTC § 405(c)). But see Reid Kress Weisbord, Reservations About Donor Standing: Should
the Law Allow Charitable Donors to Reserve the Right to Enforce a Gift Restriction?, 42 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 245, 297 (2007) (arguing in favor of an "opt-in model" that would "be tempered by a
high burden of proof placed on the plaintiff donor seeking to enforce the terms of a charitable trust
coupled with an affirmative defense framework drawn from the common law jurisprudence of charita-
ble trusts").
16. Hansmann, supra note 13, at 609-10.
17. See Chester, supra note 7, at 616-17 (arguing that the personal representative, but not the
settlor's heirs, should be able to act on behalf of a deceased settlor); see also Smithers v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Ctr., 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 436 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (granting standing to enforce
restricted gift to wife of deceased donor as "Special Administratrix" of donor's estate). Although a
charitable gift may not be considered a trust "in a technical sense," a charitable donee "may not...
receive a gift made for one purpose and use it for another, unless the court applying the cy pres doctrine
so commands." St. Joseph's Hosp. v. Bennett, 22 N.E.2d 305, 308 (N.Y. 1939). Under the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts, a gift to a charitable institution "for a specific purpose... creates a charitable trust of
which the institution is the trustee" for purposes of the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 28 cmt. a (2003).
18. See infra note 48 and accompanying text (noting widespread adoption of settlor standing
provisions such as UTC § 405(c)).
19. Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914, 915-16 (Wyo. 2007).
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tion easement, and should have standing to enforce that trust.20 Although
Lowham did not disclose his reasons for declining to sue, the time and
expense associated with litigation may be sufficient to deter some settlors
in similar circumstances.2 1 Contract law permits an obligee, acting as "as-
signor," to assign a contractual right she has against an obligor to a third
party, known as the "assignee. '22 Assignment of the settlor's right to en-
force a charitable trust, if allowed, could permit effective supervision in a
case that the attorney general might otherwise ignore.23 Lowham, for ex-
ample, could have assigned his enforcement right to Hicks, who was evi-
dently willing to take on the burden of suing to enforce the trust. This
possibility was not presented to the Hicks court, which therefore expressed
no opinion on whether such an assignment might be permitted under the
new standing rule of the UTC.
In this Article, I consider the extent to which the settlor's right to en-
force a charitable trust is, or should be, assignable in jurisdictions that now
recognize such a right. I suggest that, in answering this question, it is ap-
propriate to begin with the existing body of law governing the assignability
of contractual rights, although that body of law should not be the endpoint
of the analysis. John Langbein argued in a 1995 article that the gratuitous
private trust is contractual in nature, for "the deal between settlor and trus-
tee is functionally indistinguishable from the modem third-party-
beneficiary contract."'24 Langbein excluded the charitable trust from his
contractarian account, on the ground that it exists at "the far end of the trust
spectrum, where contractarian autonomy is more restrained. '25 Moreover,
Langbein's overall assertion that trusts are contracts is controversial, given
that a trust cannot exist without trust property.26 By allowing the settlor to
20. See UTC § 103(15) (defining "settlor" as "a person, including a testator, who creates, or
contributes property to, a trust"); McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 5, at 67 n.262.
21. McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 5, at 67.
22. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 11.1, at 60 (3d ed. 2004).
23. In the end, the Wyoming Attorney General did act in the litigation involving the Dowds. See
supra note 4. If the right of enforcement had been assigned to Hicks, however, the Attorney General's
intervention would have been unnecessary. Moreover, state attorneys general cannot always be relied
upon to intervene in such cases. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
24. John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 627
(1995).
25. Id. at631.
26. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal
and Economic Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 469-70 (1998) (arguing that "it is precisely the prop-
erty-like aspects of the trust that are the principal contribution of trust law"); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b reporter's note (2003) (surveying literature debating extent to which fiduciary
relationships are contractual in nature). For example, a mere expectancy or "hope of receiving property
in the future" cannot be held in trust, although it can be the subject of a contract if supported by consid-
eration. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 41 & cmt. c; Brainard v. Comm'r, 91 F.2d 880,
881-82 (7th Cir. 1937). Those who favor a propertarian rather than contractarian view of trust law "tend
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enforce her deal with the trustee, however, UTC § 405(c) has arguably
given more emphasis to the contractual aspect of the trust relationship. 27 If
this is so, then the law of contracts might have some bearing on the inter-
pretation of the UTC settlor standing provision, at least in the absence of
other relevant authority. 28 Standing depends on the nature of the claim
being asserted and whether the person asserting it has the right to do so.29
Contract law provides a plausible basis to grant standing to an assignee,
thus furthering the goal of improved charitable trust supervision.
It may be possible to justify assignment of the settlor's right to enforce
a charitable trust without reference to contractual principles. UTC § 405(c)
might be viewed simply as an acknowledgement of donative intent, the
promotion of which is the general policy goal of the law of donative trans-
fers. 30 Allowing the settlor to assign the enforcement right would also re-
spect the settlor's intent. Nevertheless, charitable trusts are required to
serve purposes that are beneficial to the community, which justifies their
exemption from the durational requirements that apply to private trusts. 31
Thus, whether a right of assignment is justified by reference to contractual
principles or otherwise, the intent of the settlor is not the sole factor to con-
sider in determining the extent of that right.
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I will discuss the general
problem of charitable trust enforcement and the reform of UTC § 405(c).
Part II will then examine the law relating to assignment of contractual
to be more willing to use mandatory rules that impinge upon the wishes of the settlor in order to protect
the property rights held by the beneficiary." Gallanis, supra note 10, at 1618-19; see also Melanie B.
Leslie, Trusting Trustees: Fiduciary Duties and the Limits of Default Rules, 94 GEO. L.J. 67, 88-94
(2005) (defending limitations on the ability of settlor and trustee to waive trust's fiduciary terms).
27. See Chester, supra note 7, at 614-15 (characterizing UTC § 405(c) as "concession" to Lang-
bein's "contractarian view"). The UTC official comment does not indicate, however, that a contrac-
tarian understanding of trust law motivated the grant of standing to the settlor. See § 405(c) cmt.; cf
JOEL C. DOBRIS, STEWART E. STERK & MELANIE B. LESLIE, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 694-95 (3d ed.
2007) (noting that UTC's departure from common law was accomplished "[w]ith little fanfare and no
explanation"). Langbein has suggested that § 405(c) "is not likely to make much difference.., since
charitable trusts commonly arise on the settlor's death." John H. Langbein, The Uniform Trust Code:
Codification of the Law of Trusts in the United States, 15 TR. L. INT'L 66, 67-68 (2001). Nevertheless,
the Hicks case is an example of where settlor standing could make a difference even if it is limited to
the settlor's lifetime. Moreover, as discussed in Part III infra, there is a case for allowing the settlor's
right of enforcement to be assigned by her personal representative after the settlor's death.
28. For a recent and thought-provoking exploration of how certain contract principles might shape
the future development of trust law, see David Horton, Unconscionability in the Law of Trusts, 84
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1675 (2009).
29. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitable
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 658 (1998).
30. On the privileged status of donative intent, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND
OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1 (2003).
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 & cmt. d (2003) (discussing charitable purpose
requirement and exemption from Rule Against Perpetuities).
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rights, and explain how and why courts might apply that law in the specific
context of charitable trust enforcement. I will argue that, while the Re-
statement (Second) of Contracts may be a good starting point for an analy-
sis of the permissibility of assignment under a contractarian theory of
settlor standing, that Restatement should not be transplanted wholesale into
the charitable trust context, but rather supplemented by principles derived
from the law of donative transfers. In particular, courts should consider
(1) requiring that a settlor give notice to the trustee of any assignment,
(2) forbidding successive assignments after the initial assignment by the
settlor, (3) precluding an assignment to an indefinite class, and
(4) reviewing any attempt by a trustee to settle with an assignee.
Finally, Part III will focus on the difficult question of whether the
settlor's enforcement right may be assigned after the settlor's death and, if
so, by whom. I will suggest that, unless the trust specifies otherwise, courts
should permit postmortem assignment by the settlor's personal representa-
tive, but not by the settlor's devisees or heirs, although the devisees or heirs
might serve as assignees if so designated by the settlor or the settlor's per-
sonal representative. I will also address the possibility of naming a trust
protector in the trust instrument, a possible alternative to a contractual as-
signment for settlors who anticipate the problem and are able to plan for it
prior to the trust's execution.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHARITABLE TRUST ENFORCEMENT
Since the dawn of the trust in the Middle Ages, courts and legislatures
have struggled to hold opportunistic fiduciaries to account for mismanage-
ment and misuse of charitable assets.32 Traditionally, the law's response to
this problem has been to give a state official, the attorney general, legal
authority to hold trustees to their fiduciary duties. 33 Enforcement by the
attorney general, however, has well-documented limitations.34 As an
elected or appointed public official, the Attorney General is unlikely to deal
with trustees in a way that would hinder his or her future political career. 35
32. See, e.g., FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 57-67 (describing medieval experience with charitable
institutions); 5 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT, WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER & MARK L. ASCHER, SCOTT
AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS § 37.3.10, at 2436 (5th ed. 2008) [hereinafter SCOTT AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS] (noting that "in the absence of statutory reforms, the enforcement of charitable trusts has been
more or less sporadic").
33. See FISHMAN, supra note 13, at 270-73.
34. See id. at 273-74.
35. See, e.g., Brody, supra note 13, at 946-50 (explaining how the constraints of elective office
"impel the incumbent to ignore cases that are politically dangerous and to jump into matters that are
politically irresistible but implicate only 'business' decisions of charity managers").
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Particularly when large sums of money are involved, politics can inhibit the
effective supervision of a charitable trust.36 In 2002, for example, when the
trustees of the Hershey Trust sought to diversify the trust's assets by selling
its controlling interest in the Hershey Company, public opposition in Penn-
sylvania led the state Attorney General to block the sale. 37 In an empirical
study, Klick and Sitkoff concluded that the intervention of the Attorney
General caused the Hershey Trust to forego hundreds of millions of dollars
worth of potential gain.38
Even under traditional doctrine, the Attorney General is not the only
individual with standing to sue to enforce a charitable trust. Such a suit can
also be brought by a cotrustee, or by someone with a "special interest" in
the trust's enforcement. 39 The Restatement (Second) of Trusts gives some
examples of persons with "special interest" standing. If a charitable trust is
created for "the poor members of a particular church," the Second Re-
statement explains, those members who meet the description might have
standing to sue the trustee. 40 The same might be true of the church minister
or corporation, if the trust was created to benefit the church as a whole.41
Members of the general public, however, do not have standing under the
traditional rule even if they derive some benefit from the church, as the
Attorney General is deemed to be their representative. 42 Furthermore, the
traditional rule precluded an action to enforce the trust brought "by the
settlor or his heirs or personal representatives as such."'43
Over the course of the twentieth century, courts applied the "special
interest" doctrine in a variety of contexts, showing particular flexibility
when confronted with egregious trustee misconduct or ineffective supervi-
36. See, e.g., Gary, supra note 13, at 650-55 (discussing famous Bishop Estate in Hawai'i); see
also Samuel King et al., Broken Trust, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 691, 692-96 (1999) (describing role of
politics in selection of Bishop Estate trustees).
37. Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 13, at 768-79.
38. Id. at 815-16.
39. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 (1959); see also SCOTT AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS, supra note 32, § 37.3.10, at 2439-50 (surveying relevant case law).
40. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. c.
41. Id.
42. See id. § 391 cmt. d. Traditional law did allow members of the public to seek the Attorney
General's approval to bring suit as a "relator" and pay the costs of the litigation; however, the Attorney
General could not be compelled to bring suit. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. a;
Ronald Chester, Improving Enforcement Mechanisms in the Charitable Sector: Can Increased Disclo-
sure ofInformation Be Utilized Effectively?, 40 NEw ENG. L. REv. 447, 472-73 (2006).
43. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 391 cmt. e. The traditional rule was supported by
the fact that the settlor had neither the power to modify or revoke a charitable trust, nor, in the usual
case, a beneficial interest in the trust property. See ScoTr & ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 32,
§ 37.3.10, at 2450. A settlor of a charitable trust was, however, allowed to reserve a right of "visita-
tion," a right that is rarely invoked today. Chester, supra note 42, at 473-74.
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sion by the attorney general.44 Notwithstanding the traditional rule, some
courts even granted standing to the settlor, either on the basis of the
settlor's original expectations in creating the trust or on the theory that the
settlor represented others with an interest in the trust.45 In 2000, the Uni-
form Trust Code drafters explicitly rejected the rule of the Second Re-
statement and authorized settlors to sue to enforce charitable trusts. 46 Nine
years later, settlor standing was incorporated into a tentative draft of the
Third Restatement, thus bringing the Restatement in line with the position
of the UTC.47 By 2009, the basic rule of UTC § 405(c) had been adopted in
some form by twenty-two states and the District of Columbia,48 and at least
two other states had embraced settlor standing without adopting the UTC.49
The acceptance of settlor standing to enforce charitable trusts should
be considered alongside other intent-serving UTC reforms, including the
granting of a right to the settlor of an irrevocable trust to petition for re-
moval of the trustee. 50 The latter reform, like the grant of settlor standing in
the charitable trust context, departs from the traditional rule.51 In another
departure, the UTC expressly authorizes trusts for pets and other nonchari-
table trusts without ascertainable beneficiaries, allowing the settlor to
nominate in the trust an individual to enforce it.52 The original 2000 UTC
also recognized a right to modify or terminate a trust "upon consent of the
settlor and all beneficiaries," although tax-motivated amendments in 2004
44. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. REv. 37,
61-70 (1993).
45. See Gaubatz, supra note 7, at 921-27; cf SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 32,
§ 37.3.10, at 2453 ("[A] settlor who has a special interest in the performance of the trust plainly can
enforce the trust.").
46. UTC § 405(c) (2000) cmt.
47. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(2) & cmt. g(3) (Tentative Draft No. 5, 2009).
48. See ALA. CODE § 19-3B-405(c) (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10405(C) (Supp. 2008);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 28-73-405(c) (Supp. 2007); D.C. CODE § 19-1304.05(c) (Supp. 2009); FL. STAT.
ANN. § 736.0405 (West Supp. 2009); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58a-405 (2005); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-
B, § 405(3) (Supp. 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.7405(3) (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. 456.4-405 (West
2007); NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-3831 (2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 564-B:4-405(c) (2007); N.M. STAT.
§ 46A-4-405(C) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 36C-4-405.1 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 59-12-05(3)
(Supp. 2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 5804.05(A) (West 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 130.170(3) (2007);
20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7735(c) (West Supp. 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-7-405(c) (2009); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 35-15-405 (2007); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-7-405(3) (Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14A, § 405(c) (Supp. 2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-544.05 (West Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 4-
10-406(c) (2007).
49. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §3303 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 633A.5104 (West Supp.
2009). The Delaware provision is part of a broader effort to unify the law relating to charitable and
noncharitable purpose trusts. See Adam J. Hirsch, Delaware Unifies the Law of Charitable and Non-
charitable Purpose Trusts, EST. PLAN., Nov. 2009, at 13.
50. See UTC § 706(a).
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) cmt. d(2) reporter's note (Tentative Draft No.
5, 2009).
52. See UTC §§ 408,409(2).
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made this provision optional for enacting jurisdictions. 53 Nevertheless, the
UTC drafters did not extend other rights to the settlor of a private irrevoca-
ble trust, "such as the right to an annual report or to receive other informa-
tion concerning administration of the trust."' 54 As noted by the reporter of
the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, the "modest" nature of the UTC reforms
regarding private trusts may reflect the fact that "[t]he widespread criticism
and calls for reform that have been so noticeable in the charitable con-
text... have not arisen in the private trust setting, perhaps reflecting a
general satisfaction with traditional doctrine. '55
As the UTC continues to be introduced in state legislatures, it seems
likely that its recognition of settlor standing to enforce charitable trusts will
soon become the majority rule in the United States. 56 Settlor standing,
however, does not seem to have been a panacea in the states that have
adopted it, and the few cases that have arisen in jurisdictions adopting the
UTC have focused on more traditional standing questions. One of the first
cases to apply UTC § 405(c) involved a foundation created by the late in-
dustrialist John C. Lincoln to promote the economic theories of Henry
George. 57 Decades after Lincoln's death, certain proponents of George's
theories sued the foundation and others in an Arizona probate court, com-
plaining that the foundation's board had strayed from the guiding philoso-
phy of the donor.58 Looking to the Arizona version of § 405(c), the Arizona
Court of Appeals concluded in Robert Schalkenbach Foundation v. Lincoln
Foundation, Inc. that the recently adopted UTC provision was of no benefit
to the plaintiffs. 59 The court thus focused its analysis on the traditional
concept of special interest standing, finding that such standing was lacking
in the case.60 Settlor standing was also unhelpful to the plaintiff in Riley v.
Pate, who sought to challenge the administration of the Alabama state oil
53. UTC § 411(a) & cmt.
54. UTC § 706 cmt.
55. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) cmt. d(2) reporter's note.
56. Authors continue to debate the wisdom of the UTC approach despite its apparent popularity
among state legislators. Compare SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 32, § 37.3.10, at 2452
(concluding that "settlor standing is a small price to pay for the settlor's generosity" and may encourage
creation of charitable trusts), with Reid Kress Weisbord & Peter DeScioli, The Effects of Donor Stand-
ing on Philanthropy: Insights from the Psychology of Gift-Giving, 45 GONZ. L. REv. (forthcoming
2010), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=-1435149 (contending that donor standing may paradoxi-
cally reduce charitable giving due to its psychological effects on the donor).
57. See Fleming & Curti, P.L.C., Suit Against Charity Alleging Drift from Principles Dismissed,
ELDER LAW ISSUES, July 2004, http://www.elder-law.com/2004/Issuel20l.htrnl.
58. Id.
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and gas trust.61 One justice, noting the lack of clarity in the UTC provision,
suggested that the plaintiff might have standing as a settlor, but ultimately
rejected the suit on other grounds.62
As discussed above, allowing the settlor to assign her right of en-
forcement to a third party might broaden the utility of UTC § 405(c) for
charitable trust supervision, at least when the settlor is still living after the
enactment of the statute and can make an effective assignment.63 In Schal-
kenbach and Riley, the question of whether a settlor might assign her en-
forcement right was not raised, as no assignment had taken place. While
UTC § 405(c) has nothing to say on the validity of such an assignment,
statutes recently enacted in Delaware and Iowa expressly approve both
settlor standing and the designation of a third party to act on the settlor's
behalf, although the statutes differ in their specifics. 64
Under the Delaware provision, a settlor "may designate a person or
persons, whether or not born at the time of such designation, to enforce a
charitable or noncharitable trust .... ,,65 Although the Delaware statute
does not explicitly state how the delegation may be made, it appears in a
paragraph discussing "the terms of a governing instrument of a trust,"
which may indicate that the delegation must be made in the trust instru-
ment.66 Iowa, on the other hand, grants a right of enforcement, following
the settlor's death or incapacity, to the settlor's designee, who may be des-
ignated "either in the agreement establishing the trust or in a written state-
ment signed by the settlor and delivered to the trustee," and who may or
may not be "born at the time of such designation."'67 At some point, a court
is likely to face the question of whether the principle of third-party designa-
tion recognized to some extent in Delaware and Iowa ought to apply under
61. 3 So. 3d 835, 839-40 (Ala. 2008).
62. See id. at 840-42 (Bolin, J., concurring) (noting that, while the statute "clearly granted an
additional right to a sole or joint settlor of a charitable trust to enforce that trust," the legislature "unfor-
tunately... was not as clear in setting out what person or entity actually possesses that standing as a
settlor").
63. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21 (discussing Hicks v. Dowd, 157 P.3d 914 (Wyo.
2007)).
64. On the other hand, Michigan's recently adopted version of UTC § 405(c) expressly precludes
enforcement by the "settlor's heirs, assigns, or beneficiaries." See MICH. CoMP. LAWS § 700.7405(3)
(2009) (effective Apr. 1, 2010). The Vermont legislature deleted the reference to "among others" in its
version of the provision, stating simply that "[t]he settlor of a charitable trust, the attorney general, a
cotrustee, or a person with a special interest in the charitable trust may maintain a proceeding to enforce
the trust." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14A, § 405(c) (2009).
65. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, §3303(b) (2008).
66. See id. A delegation made in the trust instrument itself might be valid even without specific
statutory authorization. Cf Rettek v. Ellis Hosp., No. 1:08-CV-844, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1607, at
* 13 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009) (stating that "donors can ensure their wishes are honored by expressly
providing for enforcement by family members or forfeiture if their restrictions are not satisfied").
67. IOWA CODE §§ 633A.5104, 633A.5106 (2008).
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UTC § 405(c) or another statute that does not address the issue directly.
When that case arises, the court may be interested to learn that the common
law has already dealt with this question, albeit not in the context of charita-
ble trusts. The next Part will examine what relevance contract law might
have to the assignment of the settlor's enforcement right in the charitable
trust context.
II. CONTRACT LAW AND CHARITABLE TRUSTS
For contract law to have some bearing on the assignability of charita-
ble trust enforcement rights, one must accept that a charitable trust is in
some sense contractual in nature. Over a century ago, F.W. Maitland ex-
pressed the opinion that the English trust is actually a contract, even though
it has evolved separately from contract law. 68 In enforcing the trust, the
Chancellor enforced a "personal right" that "in truth is a contractual right, a
right created by a promise."' 69 Austin Wakeman Scott disagreed with Mait-
land's conclusion, arguing in the Columbia Law Review that the creation of
a trust was "a legal transaction quite different from the creation of a con-
tract."'70 Scott's reasoning was based partly on a supposed hostility in the
common law to the enforcement of contract rights by third-party benefici-
aries. 71 As Langbein notes in his 1995 defense of the contractarian theory
of trust law, however, the right of a third party to enforce a contract made
to his benefit was well-established in American contract law by the time
Scott wrote his article. 72 Thus, while Scott was correct to analogize the
trust relationship to a contract for a third-party beneficiary, that analogy
posed no "obstacle to the contractarian analysis of the modem trust. '73
Some scholars have criticized the contractarian theory of trust law as
elucidated by Langbein in his article. Henry Hansmann and Ugo Mattei, for
example, contend that the special contribution of trust law lies not in its
contractual nature, but in its "property-like aspect," which allows the
68. FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, EQUITY: A COURSE OF LECTURES 110-11 (A.H. Chaytor & W.J.
Whittaker eds, John Brunyate rev., 2d ed. 1936) (1909).
69. Id. at 29.
70. Austin Wakeman Scott, The Nature of the Rights of the Cestui Que Trust, 17 COLUM. L. REV.
269, 269 (1917).
71. See id. at 270.
72. Langbein, supra note 24, at 646-47.
73. Id. at 647; see also F.H. LAWSON, A COMMON LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CIVIL LAW 200 (1953)
("Nor need the three-cornered relation of settlor, trustee, and cestui que trust trouble us; for... it is
easily explained in the modem law in terms of a contract for the benefit of a third party."); cf. VERNON
VALENTINE PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY: A HISTORY OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
AT ENGLISH LAW 1-2 (1992) (noting that the common-law rule prohibiting actions by third-party bene-
ficiaries "has been fully overcome.., in nearly all jurisdictions in the United States").
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settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries to "(re)organize their contractual relation-
ships with a large number of parties other than themselves, which would
otherwise be extremely difficult to do."'74 Nevertheless, Hansmann and
Mattei do not deny that trust law has "an important contractual aspect," and
they concede that it is legitimate to emphasize that contractual aspect in
advocating normative reforms that would make trust law more flexible and
more responsive to the concerns of settlors.75
In his 1995 article, Langbein chose not to address charitable trusts,
considering them to be "quasi-public institutions" that are subject to "stan-
dards of public benefit articulated both in the common law and in the tax
code and regulatory law."76 The UTC, which was promulgated after the
publication of Langbein's article, reaffirmed the public benefit requirement
for charitable trusts.77 By giving the settlor standing to enforce the terms of
a charitable trust, however, the UTC effectively turned the trustee's prom-
ise to administer the trust into a binding agreement between trustee and
settlor, granting the settlor some supervisory authority in consideration of
her acts creating or funding the trust. 78 In the private trust context, it was
the historical decision of the Chancellor to treat the trustee's promise as an
enforceable right that led Maitland to characterize the trust as contractual in
nature.79 Moreover, the fact that an agreement may be limited in effect by
considerations of public policy, as is true for a charitable trust, does not
necessarily preclude a finding that the agreement is contractually binding. 80
74. See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 26, at 470.
75. Seeid. at471.
76. Langbein, supra note 24, at 631.
77. See UTC § 405(a) (2000) ("A charitable trust may be created for the relief of poverty, the
advancement of education or religion, the promotion of health, governmental or municipal purposes, or
other purposes the achievement of which is beneficial to the community.").
78. In order to qualify as a settlor under the UTC, an individual must either create the trust or
contribute property to it. See UTC § 103(15) (defining "settlor"). Traditionally, the settlor's transfer of
property to the trust was treated as the equivalent of consideration in contract law, and no additional
consideration was required for the creation of a trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 29
(1959). As Langbein has explained, however, the usual compensation paid to the trustee would also
qualify as consideration, as would "the trustee's promise to hold the property for the beneficiary, which
induces the settlor to transfer the property to the trustee." Langbein, supra note 24, at 632 n.3 1.
79. See MAITLAND, supra note 68, at 29 (explaining how the trust arose as a consequence of the
Chancellor's decision to enforce the promise of the trustee).
80. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981) (setting out circumstances in which
a contractual term limiting a party's liability in tort may be enforced). Additional support for the notion
that a charitable gift may constitute a contract may be found in the famous case of Trustees of Dart-
mouth College v. Woodward, which held that the founding charter of Dartmouth College constituted "a
contract to which the donors, the trustees, and the crown... were the original parties." 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 518, 643-44 (1819); see also Kapiolani Park Pres. Soc'y v. Honolulu, 751 P.2d 1022, 1027
(Haw. 1988) (describing Dartmouth College as "the most famous case in American judicial history,
with respect to charitable trusts").
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A. Assignment of Rights: A Contractarian Perspective
By granting an enforcement right to the settlor of a charitable trust,
therefore, UTC § 405(c) has arguably strengthened the case for examining
charitable trusts from a contractarian perspective. Although § 405(c) does
not state that the settlor's right to enforce a charitable trust is assignable,
neither the text nor the official comment expressly forbids assignment.
There is some historical precedent for expanding contractual rights by judi-
cial decision, as the English courts did by gradually recognizing claims
brought by assignees of choses in action.81 States enacting the UTC do so
as a supplement to the existing "common law of trusts and principles of
equity."8 2 As the UTC drafters note, "[t]he common law of trusts is not
static but includes the contemporary and evolving rules of decision devel-
oped by the courts in exercise of their power to adapt the law to new situa-
tions and changing conditions. '83 Settlor standing arguably presents a new
situation that justifies a reconsideration of the traditional law of charitable
trusts. Modem courts applying the settlor standing provision of UTC
§ 405(c), therefore, might look to contractual principles to fill in the gaps
left by the language of the uniform act.
Langbein suggests that, when faced with a doubtful point of law, a
court applying the contractarian theory of trusts ought to apply orthodox
default rule theory as it relates to contracts. 84 In other words, courts should
focus on the intention of the parties, "and if they did not articulate their
intention," then consider "which default rule captures the likely bargain
they would have struck had they thought about it. ' '85 Since the UTC provi-
sion on settlor enforcement of charitable trusts makes no mention of as-
81. See 7 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 532-39 (2d ed. 1937); see also
O.R. MARSHALL, THE ASSIGNMENT OF CHOSES IN ACTION 72-80 (1950) (describing process by which
Chancery circumvented common-law rule prohibiting assignment of choses in action). The "growing
importance of credit" likely influenced the gradual recognition of assignability beginning in the seven-
teenth century. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 11.2, at 63-65. Trusts were treated differently
because the beneficiary had a property interest in the trust assets. See D.E.C. Yale, Introduction to 2
LORD NOIrINGHAM'S CHANCERY CASES 89-90 (D.E.C. Yale ed. 1961); Langbein, supra note 24, at
635 & n.47.
82. UTC § 106 (2000).
83. Id. § 106 cmt.
84. For analysis of the proper role of default rules in contract law, see ROBERT COOTER &
THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 212-14 (4th ed. 2004), and RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.1, at 96-99 (7th ed. 2007).
85. Langbein, supra note 24, at 664. This type of default rule is classified as a "majoritarian
default." See Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search of its Context, 73
FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1037-43 (2004).
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signability,86 it is worth considering what default rule has been established
outside the trust context. That rule is set out in the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts:
A contractual right can be assigned unless
(a) the substitution of a right of the assignee for the right of the as-
signor would materially change the duty of the obligor, or materially in-
crease the burden or risk imposed on him by his contract, or materially
impair his chance of obtaining return performance, or materially reduce
its value to him, or
(b) the assignment is forbidden by statute or is otherwise inoperative on
grounds of public policy, or
(c) assignment is validly precluded by contract. 87
Thus, while the baseline presumption in contract law is in favor of as-
signability, there are exceptions. Assuming that no statute or trust provision
precludes assignment, the most relevant exceptions in the trust context
involve (a) the effects of assignment on the trustee and (b) the thomy con-
cept of public policy.
Until recently, a charitable trustee faced with a proposed assignment
of enforcement rights would have had a straightforward defense under
paragraph (a) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts quoted above. This
is because, under traditional law, a trustee could resign only with the
court's permission, or perhaps with the consent of all beneficiaries, unless
the terms of the trust provided otherwise. 88 Under the UTC, by contrast, a
trustee may resign simply by giving "30 days' notice to the qualified bene-
ficiaries, the settlor, if living, and all cotrustees. '' 89 Thus, the trustee is no
longer a prisoner in the court's control. Moreover, in light of the trustee's
ability under the UTC to freely exit the trust relationship, it is hard to see
the trustee as performing a uniquely personal obligation to the beneficiar-
ies, which would bar assignment under contract law.90
The common-law rule prohibiting assignment of personal service con-
tracts is illustrated by the case of Munchak Corp. v. Cunningham. In Mun-
chak, a professional basketball player's contract with his team was held to
86. The official comment states merely that "[t]he grant of standing to the settlor does not negate
the right of the state attorney general or persons with special interests to enforce either the trust or their
interests." UTC § 405(c) cmt.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (1981).
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 106 (1959).
89. UTC § 705(a)(1). When the trustee of a charitable trust wishes to resign, the attorney general
and any "charitable organization expressly designated to receive distributions" under the trust's terms
may have the notice rights of a qualified beneficiary if certain conditions are met. See id. § 110.
90. A contract right may not be assigned when it "involves obligations of a personal nature." See
29 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 74:10 (4th
ed. 2003 & Supp. 2009).
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be assignable from one owner of that team to another notwithstanding a
prohibition against assignment to a different team. 91 As the court saw it, a
change in corporate ownership of the athlete's current team-in contrast to
an assignment to a different team-could not affect the athlete's perform-
ance, and thus the assignment did not violate the policy of contract law "to
prohibit an assignment of a contract in which the obligor undertakes to
serve only the original obligee."' 92 A modem trustee undertakes to serve the
settlor as well as the beneficiaries, and is in effect the agent of both.93 The
trustee, however, may resign without cause at any time, leaving the settlor
and beneficiaries with a new trustee. In such circumstances, a fair rule
would allow the settlor also to find a substitute for herself, like the team
owner in Munchak. This reasoning is reinforced by the modem rule allow-
ing trustees to delegate their fiduciary duties to a third party when a prudent
person would deem such delegation appropriate.94 While a settlor may
select a trustee based on personal confidence, liberal exit and delegation
rules have made the trustee effectively fungible once the administration has
begun. Appointing a trustee is thus quite different from hiring an artist to
paint a portrait, the quintessential example of a personal services contract.95
It seems unlikely, therefore, that the assignment of a settlor's right to
enforce a charitable trust would materially change the trustee's duty in a
UTC jurisdiction. If the settlor selects a single assignee, moreover, the bur-
den imposed on the trustee should not greatly exceed what is already im-
posed by UTC § 405(c), nor should the assignment substantially reduce the
trustee's expected compensation. On the other hand, if the settlor attempted
to assign his enforcement right to a large group of individuals, the in-
creased exposure to litigation resulting from such an assignment might
increase the trustee's burden beyond what was initially contemplated by the
parties and frustrate the trustee's reasonable short-term expectations. 96
91. 457 F.2d 721, 725-26 (4thCir. 1972).
92. Id.
93. See Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
623-24 (2004).
94. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 171 (1959) (disallowing delegation of duties
"which the trustee can reasonably be required personally to perform"), with RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS: PRUDENT INVESTOR RULE § 171 (1992) (allowing prudent delegation of duties), and UNIF.
PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 9 (1994) (specifying conditions for delegation).
95. See DeVenney v. Hill, 918 So. 2d 106, 116 (Ala. 2005) (noting that "unassignable personal-
service contracts relate to services that involve special skills, such as the painting of a portrait by an
artist").
96. An assignment to multiple individuals could be particularly problematic if the assignees are
domiciled in different jurisdictions, although jurisdictional conflicts may arise regardless of the identity
of the assignee. Cf I JEFFREY A. SCHOENBLUM, MULTISTATE AND MULTINATIONAL ESTATE
PLANNING § 17.03[D], at 17-43 to 17-44 (2009 ed.) (discussing standing and jurisdictional questions
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With its focus on the intention of the parties, however, the approach of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides a framework for evaluating
such issues on a case-by-case basis.
Perhaps the more difficult issue posed by the assignment of a settlor's
enforcement right concerns the public policy exception. In addition to in-
creasing the burden on the trustee, an assignment raising the specter of
"frequent, unreasonable, and vexatious litigation" that once led the courts
to consolidate enforcement rights in the person of the attorney general may
also violate public policy.97 In particular, assignment could raise a conflict
with the doctrine of cy pres. Under the UTC, a court may modify a charita-
ble trust to conform to the presumed intent of the settlor "if a particular
charitable purpose becomes unlawful, impracticable, impossible to achieve,
or wasteful."' 98 A central purpose of the cy pres doctrine is to reduce the
risk "that designated charitable purposes may become obsolete as the needs
and circumstances of society evolve over time." 99 If a settlor is permitted to
assign his enforcement right to a third party, that individual might have
standing to contest any cy pres proceeding, which could complicate such
litigation by shifting the focus to private rather than public concerns. This
could be particularly problematic if successive assignments are permitted-
i.e., if the settlor's original assignee can make a subsequent assignment to a
third party.
An example may serve to illustrate this point. Suppose that S, a settlor
in a UTC jurisdiction, creates a charitable trust to provide scholarship funds
to students of a particular race attending a university that S founded. 100 S
then assigns his § 405(c) enforcement right to his son A, who is not a bene-
ficiary of the trust. Many decades later, after S's death, A assigns the en-
forcement right to B, S's granddaughter. No notice is given to the trustee of
the assignments by S or A. Subsequently, a court determines that the racial
restriction is unlawful or impracticable. The trustee petitions to modify the
trust so as to provide scholarships for needy students without regard to
race. B objects to the modification on the ground that S would have pre-
ferred for the trust to terminate rather than open up the scholarship to stu-
dents of all races. Should considerations of public policy bar B from
that may arise in applying cy pres doctrine when more than one state has "an interest in the administra-
tion of a charitable trust or corporation").
97. See Sarkeys v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 40, Cleveland County, 592 P.2d 529, 534 (Okla. 1979)
(discussing this traditional concern), quoted in Blasko, supra note 44, at 41-42.
98. UTC § 413(a) (2000).
99. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 67 cmt. a (2003).
100. For a notable non-UTC case involving the application of cy pres to a racial restriction of this
type, see Coffee v. William Marsh Rice Univ., 403 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. 1966).
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objecting to the modification, notwithstanding the sequence of assign-
ments? And what if the trustee attempts to pay B from the trust funds to
prevent B from objecting to the cy pres petition-should the payment be
allowed?
Unfortunately, existing case law on the concept of public policy is far
from straightforward. As one prominent state court has admitted, "[t]here is
no precise definition of the term."101 On the basis of public policy, courts
have refused to recognize the assignment of various types of claims, in-
cluding claims for damages for personal injury that have not yet been re-
duced to judgment, 102 insurance proceeds whose assignment would benefit
the slayer of the insured, 103 and legal malpractice claims purportedly as-
signed to an adversary in the litigation that gave rise to the malpractice
suit. 104 These categories of claims, however, generally have a positive mar-
ket value for the assignee, while the right to enforce a charitable trust is not
necessarily valuable in market terms. Moreover, delegating the primary
responsibility for charitable trust supervision to the attorney general can
also harm society, as the example of the Hershey Trust shows. 105
Unless every assignment of a charitable trust enforcement right is to
be treated as a violation of public policy, courts must either apply a flexible
standard to determine the validity of each assignment, or simply define
certain types of assignments as per se impermissible. 106 A chain of assign-
ments from one person to the next, as in the example above, could frustrate
the greater goals of society by giving too many persons in succession the
power to interfere with the trust's administration. The same might be true
of an attempted assignment to a large and poorly defined class of individu-
als. Even if only a small percentage of the general population would be
willing to devote the time and expense necessary to sue to enforce a chari-
table trust, that percentage could add up to a significant number of lawsuits
if the class of potential litigants is sufficiently large. By contrast, a single
assignment to a particular individual chosen by the settlor could be a rea-
101. Palmateer v. Int'l Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d 876, 878 (111. 198 1).
102. Croxton v. Crowley Mar. Corp., 758 P.2d 97, 99 (Alaska 1988).
103. Rottmund v. Cont'l Assurance Co., 761 F. Supp. 1203, 1209-10 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
104. Gurski v. Rosenblum and Filan, LLC, 885 A.2d 163, 167 (Conn. 2005).
105. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
106. A flexible standard based on reasonableness, for example, is applied to trust provisions condi-
tioned on a particular marriage. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 6.2 cmt. a (1983). The application of this test in the marriage context, however, has been criticized as
arbitrary and unpredictable. See Jeffrey G. Sherman, Posthumous Meddling: An Instrumentalist Theory
of Testamentary Restraints on Conjugal and Religious Choices, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1273, 13 17-22.
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sonable and effective way to ensure that a charitable trust is properly moni-
tored during the settlor's lifetime or immediately after the settlor's death.107
B. The Limits of Contractarian Reasoning
The public policy concerns raised by an unrestricted right of assign-
ment suggest that the existing law of contracts provides incomplete an-
swers at best when applied in the context of charitable trusts. A trust
involves not only a deal between a settlor and trustee, but also the transfer
of legal and equitable title to the property and the creation of a fiduciary
relationship between the trustee and the beneficiaries. Particularly when the
trust in question is charitable, the law may have greater concern for the
present needs of the charitable beneficiaries than the terms of the initial
bargain between settlor and trustee.1 08 Moreover, the limited nature of the
UTC's expansion of settlor rights in the noncharitable context could be
taken to indicate that a concern for the specific problem of charitable trust
supervision, rather than a strong overall commitment to the contractarian
theory of trusts, was the primary impetus for the settlor standing rule of
§ 405(c). 109 If this is so, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts may be of
limited use in understanding the intent of the UTC drafting committee.
Reasoning that is generally appropriate in contract law may be out of place
in a fiduciary context.1 10 While contractual principles provide a useful jus-
tification for recognizing an assignment of the settlor's enforcement right,
therefore, those principles should be adapted as necessary to take into ac-
count the distinctive nature of gratuitous transfers.
To flesh out the amorphous concept of public policy with regard to the
assignment of charitable trust enforcement rights, courts might look to four
principles already familiar to the law of trusts. First, trust law protects a
potential trustee from unknowingly assuming the burden of a fiduciary
relationship. Although notice is not required for a valid trust, I 1 the role of
107. One justification for allowing settlor standing in the first place is that the settlor is unlikely to
bring "repetitious or harassing litigation." See SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 32,
§ 37.3.10, at 2452. An assignment to a single individual selected by the settlor might be defended on
similar grounds.
108. Cf UTC § 413 (2000) (modifying traditional doctrine of cy pres so as to allow modification of
"wasteful" provisions and establish presumption of general charitable intent on the part of settlor).
109. On the UTC expansion of settlor rights with regard to noncharitable trusts, see supra notes
50-55 and accompanying text.
110. See Gregory S. Alexander, A Cognitive Theory of Fiduciary Relationships, 85 CORNELL L.
REv. 767, 774-78 (2000).
111. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 14 (2003).
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trustee cannot be imposed upon a person without her consent. 112 An ex-
press trust may be created by a transfer or appointment of property to the
trustee during the settlor's lifetime or at death, or by a declaration that the
settlor holds certain property as trustee. 113 When the settlor intends to cre-
ate an inter vivos trust other than by declaration, delivery sufficient to pass
title to the property is required in order for the trust to take effect. 1 4 A
prospective trustee, however, may decline the office prior to accepting it.115
Only upon accepting the office does the trustee become subject to the wide
range of fiduciary duties owed to the beneficiaries. 116
Contract law does not identify a mechanism by which the other con-
tracting party (the trustee) would be made aware of an assignment, requir-
ing only that the assignor give notice to the assignee or a third party acting
on the assignee's behalf. 117 This requirement, developed to handle specific
and often short-term market transactions,1 18 would seem inadequate as
applied to the assignment of a general right to enforce a charitable trust,
given the burdensome fiduciary duties of the trustee. Although an assign-
ment would not augment the trustee's fiduciary duties with respect to the
settlor and the public, it might increase the trustee's likelihood of being the
target of litigation on the basis of a real or imagined breach, depending on
the identity of the assignee. If the settlor may assign the § 405(c) enforce-
ment right without giving notice to the trustee, the trustee could learn about
the assignment only in the event of a dispute, which could occur many
years after the settlor's death.
As discussed above, the trustee's ability to resign without court ap-
proval under the UTC is an important element of the case in favor of as-
signability. 119 The ability to resign will only protect the trustee, however, if
the trustee is made aware of the assignment. Moreover, a sole trustee who
resigns is not relieved of the trustee's duties until a successor trustee is
112. That is, unless the trust is a constructive trust imposed to prevent unjust enrichment. See id.
§ 1 cmt. e.
113. See id. § 10.
114. Seeid. §16cmt. b.
115. Seeid. §35.
116. For examples of these fiduciary duties, see UTC §§ 801-813 (2000).
117. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 324 (1981). Whether the obligee's actions are
sufficient to make an effective assignment "is a question of interpretation to be answered from all the
circumstances, including words and other conduct." See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 11.3, at 69.
118. Illustrations used in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts typically involve building contracts
and short-term employment contracts. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 321 cmts.
a-b, illus. 1, 2, 3, 5.
119. See supra text accompanying note 89 (explaining how trustee's ability to resign under UTC
§ 705(a)(1) supports right of assignment for settlor).
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appointed, 120 and finding a successor trustee might be difficult under the
looming threat of a lawsuit by an assignee. Courts might therefore require,
as a condition of validity, that the settlor provide reasonable notice to the
trustee of any assignment that is not evident in the trust instrument. If the
trustee resigns, the continuing effectiveness of the assignment would re-
quire giving reasonable notice to the successor trustee.
Second, trust law generally limits the settlor's ability to control the
postmortem administration and disposition of trust assets to those circum-
stances that the settlor could reasonably foresee. 121 In the charitable trust
context, this notion manifests itself in the doctrine of cy pres, while in the
private trust context it has been expressed both through the Rule Against
Perpetuities and through modem rules allowing modification and termina-
tion in light of changed circumstances. 122 From trust law's traditional re-
luctance to adhere to stale decisions by the settlor, courts could derive a
rule prohibiting any subsequent assignment of the settlor's right to enforce
a charitable trust under UTC § 405(c) after the initial assignment by the
settlor.
Although the settlor can make an informed judgment as to who should
best supervise the trust in his place, any additional assignments would re-
flect the judgment of the assignees, not the settlor, and are thus more diffi-
cult to justify under the language of § 405(c), which focuses on the settlor's
enforcement right. Moreover, while free transferability of short-term con-
tractual rights may be necessary for the functioning of a market econ-
omy, 123 charitable trusts can be institutions of indefinite duration. 124
Drawing the line at the settlor's initial assignment would help to ensure that
the trustee does not face a new potential opponent in litigation at regular
120. UTC § 707(a).
121. See ARTHUR HOBHOUSE, THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SU13JECT OF ENDOWMENTS
AND SET-rLEMENTS OF PROPERTY 138 (1880) ("A clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between
those persons and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see.").
122. See, e.g., UTC § 413 (establishing cy pres doctrine for charitable trusts); id. § 412 (allowing
modification and termination of noncharitable trusts in the event of changed circumstances); UNIF.
STATUTORY RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § I (amended 1990) (revising traditional Rule Against
Perpetuities for noncharitable trusts). For a discussion of why charitable trusts are not subject to the
traditional Rule Against Perpetuities, see Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33, 84-87 (1999). Admittedly, the recent abolition of the Rule Against Perpetui-
ties in many jurisdictions calls into question the commitment of contemporary legislatures to the princi-
ple of restraining the dead hand. See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Jurisdictional Competition to Abolish the
Rule Against Perpetuities: R.IP. for the R.A.P., 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 2097, 2117-18 (2003) (explaining
why "agency costs and externalities" associated with perpetual trusts "are unlikely to influence legisla-
tures considering abolition of the Rule").
123. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 22, § 11.2 at 63 (discussing importance of assignment in con-
tracts for sale of goods on credit).
124. A charitable trust may, but need not, continue indefinitely. See SCOTT AND ASCHER ON
TRUSTS, supra note 32, § 37.4.1, at 2476-77.
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intervals over the course of the trust's existence. A settlor who wishes to
provide for permanent supervision of the trustee could assign her § 405(c)
right to a corporation or charitable organization rather than an individual,
which would provide a measure of certainty for the trustee and the benefi-
ciaries. 125 On the other hand, in the event that an individual assignee dies
or becomes incapacitated during the settlor's lifetime, courts could treat the
§ 405(c) right of enforcement as having reverted to the settlor, thus permit-
ting the settlor to select a replacement assignee without violating the rule
against successive assignments. 126 To remove any possible ambiguity, a
settlor might add an express provision to this effect in the instrument mak-
ing the initial assignment.
Third, trust law generally requires a noncharitable trust to have a defi-
nite beneficiary.127 Although charitable trusts are exempt from this princi-
ple, 128 an assignment of the settlor's enforcement right to private
individuals need not be. Thus, a purported assignment of the enforcement
right to the settlor's "friends," or another undefined class, could be treated
as per se invalid, just as a trust in favor of such a class would be invalid for
lack of a definite beneficiary. 129 Courts could look to existing precedent
defining a "definite class" for trust purposes in ruling on the validity of
proposed assignments. 130 In the event that a settlor attempts to make an
assignment to a class that is not yet closed, such as "my descendants per
stirpes," courts could construe the class of potential assignees as being
limited to those individuals who are able to accept the assignment at the
time it is made, as the law currently does for class gifts. 13 1
125. To some extent, this can already be accomplished by providing for a gift over to an alternate
charity in the event that the trust's original purposes "become outmoded or fail." See PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS § 440 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009) (describing how a
gift over can be employed to circumvent presumption that settlor's initial purposes become stale over
time).
126. Such a conclusion could find support in the concept of a resulting trust, which arises in favor
of the transferor or the transferor's successors in interest when an express trust fails. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS §§ 7-8 (2003). The possibility of assignment by the settlor's personal representative
is dealt with in Part III infra.
127. See UTC § 402(3). Limited exceptions exist under the UTC for noncharitable trusts enforced
for no more than 21 years and trusts in favor of pets. Id. §§ 408, 409(1).
128. Id. § 402(3)(A).
129. See, e.g., Clark v. Campbell, 133 A. 166, 170-71 (N.H. 1926) (declining to find valid trust in
favor of settlor's "friends"). On the definite beneficiary requirement, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 44 (2003). For an effort to define the term "friend," see Ethan J. Leib, Friendship & the Law,
54 UCLA L. REV. 631,642-47 (2007).
130. For relevant cases in the trust context, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 45 reporter's
notes (2003).
131. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 15.1
(Tentative Draft No. 4, 2004) (explaining class-closing rule).
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Finally, a rule allowing assignment of § 405(c) enforcement rights
must not depart from the underlying requirement that charitable trusts serve
a purpose beneficial to the community. 132 Faced with the prospect of a suit
by an assignee to enforce the trust, the trustee might be tempted to pay the
assignee out of trust funds to drop the suit, thus expending those funds in a
way that arguably does not benefit the community. In order for a trust to
qualify as charitable, the property and income from the trust may not be
devoted to private use. 133 A rule requiring court approval for any payment
to the assignee of the settlor's enforcement right, or any settlement between
the trustee and an assignee, could limit or avoid this problem. 134
In short, while contract law might not provide a definite answer as to
whether a particular assignment violates public policy, principles derived
from the law of noncharitable trusts may provide some guidance. Future
courts interpreting UTC § 405(c) could combine existing rules of trust and
contract law to make sense of a novel circumstance not yet anticipated in
either context. Requiring reasonable notice to the trustee, barring succes-
sive assignments, mandating that an assignment be made to a definite indi-
vidual or class, and subjecting any payment to or settlement with an
assignee to the approval of the court could minimize the potential conflict
with the special policy concerns implicated by charitable trusts.
In some cases, however, the settlor may have died without having
made any initial assignment, but another individual may claim to represent
the interest of the deceased settlor. When this occurs, courts will need to
decide whether that individual can make an assignment on the deceased
settlor's behalf. Given that many charitable trusts come into being at the
settlor's death,135 the validity of postmortem assignments is an important
issue, which the next Part will address.
III. POSTMORTEM ASSIGNMENTS
When a person dies, the net probate estate passes to that person's heirs
or devisees. 136 During administration, however, a personal representative
has the same power over the property that the decedent had, albeit in a
132. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 28 (2003) (setting out examples of permissible
purposes for charitable trusts).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 376 (1959).
134. Under the UTC, a cy pres proceeding to modify a charitable trust requires court approval. See
§ 413(a)(3). Any payment to or settlement with an assignee could also be subject to court supervision.
135. See Langbein, supra note 27, at 67-68.
136. See UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-101 (1990); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER
DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 (1999).
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fiduciary capacity. 137 If a settlor has died without assigning her right to
enforce a charitable trust, therefore, there are multiple parties who could
plausibly claim to stand in the shoes of the deceased settlor. A court that
recognizes a right of postmortem assignment must decide whether it can be
exercised only by the personal representative, or also by the decedent's
heirs or devisees.138
Under the common law, so-called "personal" actions did not survive
the death of the plaintiff, under the doctrine of actio personalis moritur
cum persona.139 The continuing utility of this doctrine, however, is doubt-
ful. 140 Moreover, as discussed above, the reforms of the UTC have made
the role of trustee less personal in nature. 141 The same contractarian theory
that explains the grant of settlor standing in UTC § 405(c) might justify
making the settlor's right of action survivable, if a suitable person can be
found to bring the lawsuit in the deceased settlor's place. 142 On the other
hand, allowing someone to make an initial assignment on behalf of a de-
ceased settlor raises the same concern as successive assignments: namely,
that the settlor's own intent is not being given effect. 143 If postmortem as-
signments are to be allowed, some limitations ought to be imposed on their
exercise.
It is well-established that a decedent's personal representative may as-
sign rights that belonged to the decedent prior to death. This conclusion is
reached, for example, by the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
which allows a domiciliary executor or administrator to assign "any trans-
ferable claim of the decedent." 144 When a domiciliary executor or adminis-
trator transfers a chose in action to a third party, courts have long held that
137. See, e.g., UNIF. PROB. CODE § 3-711 (stating that "[u]ntil termination of his appointment a
personal representative has the same power over the title to property of the estate that an absolute owner
would have, in trust however, for the benefit of the creditors and others interested in the estate").
138. Courts have reached differing conclusions on the question of whether the heirs or personal
representatives of the settlor can sue directly to enforce the trust. Compare Three Bills, Inc. v. City of
Parma, 676 N.E.2d 1273, 1276 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (applying traditional law to exclude settlor's heir
from enforcing charitable trust), with In re Hill, 509 N.W.2d 168, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (granting
standing to settlor's descendant who had formerly served as trustee), and St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc. v.
McCarthy, 829 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (declining to rule that relative of settlor of
charitable trust lacks standing to enforce it). The majority rule, however, appears to be that they cannot
do so. See SCOTT AND ASCHER ON TRUSTS, supra note 32, § 37.3.10, at 2453.
139. See Florence Frances Cameron, Note, Defamation Survivability and the Demise of the Anti-
quated "Actio Personalis" Doctrine, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1833 (1985).
140. See id. at 1838-43.
141. See supra notes 89-94 and accompanying text.
142. See Chester, supra note 7, at 616-17.
143. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
144. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 333 (1971).
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the assignee may bring suit in another state in his own name. 145 Whether
the assignment should be made is within the personal representative's dis-
cretion. 146 Thus, if the settlor's right to enforce a charitable trust survives
the death of the settlor, traditional contractual principles would support
granting the personal representative the authority to assign the right.
By contrast, courts usually frown on attempts by heirs or devisees to
sue on a contractual claim of the decedent. At least while the estate is being
administered, such claims are said to be within the exclusive province of
the executor or administrator. 147 Courts have allowed a few exceptions to
this rule, as when the personal representative has a conflict of interest,
commits fraud, or refuses to act in the interest of the estate. 148 Unless such"special circumstances" exist, however, only the personal representative
has the authority to bring suit in the decedent's place. 149
A court following this case law, therefore, might bar the heirs or devi-
sees of a deceased settlor from assigning the settlor's right to enforce a
charitable trust, but allow the personal representative to assign the right, at
least while the administration is pending.150 This would fit with existing
commentary and case law regarding the postmortem exercise (as opposed
to assignment) of the right of enforcement. Ronald Chester has proposed
that the settlor's personal representative, but not the heirs, have the right to
enforce a charitable trust under UTC § 405(c). 151 One of the few reported
cases to involve a postmortem exercise of a donor's right of supervision,
Smithers v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital Center, allowed the decedent's
wife to exercise the right not as his heir or devisee, but as his estate's
145. See, e.g., Harper v. Butler, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 239, 240 (1829); Peterson v. Chemical Bank, 27
How. Pr. 491 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1864).
146. See Archibald v. Midwest Paper Stock Co., 158 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Iowa 1968).
147. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Buchanan, 71 A. 745, 746 (N.J. 1909) ("Heirs, next of kin, and credi-
tors cannot, in their own names, prosecute actions at law or suits in equity to recover the unadministered
estate of a decedent or to collect debts or other choses in action due him. Such suits can be maintained
only by the qualified personal representatives of the deceased.")
148. See, e.g., Trincia v. Testardi, 52 A.2d 871, 877 (Del. Ch. 1947) (examining exception for
fraud); Montana ex rel. Palmer v. Dist. Court of the Ninth Judicial Dist., 619 P.2d 1201, 1203 (Mont.
1980) (recognizing exception when personal representative fails to act on claim); In re Guardianship of
Archer, 203 S.W.3d 16, 22 (Tex. App. 2006) (discussing exceptions for conflict of interest and failure
to act).
149. See In re Estate of Long, 732 P.2d 1347, 1351 (Mont. 1987). But cf Howard v. Adm'rs of the
Tulane Educ. Fund, 986 So. 2d 47, 58 (La. 2008) (holding that under Louisiana Civil Code "heirs and
universal legatees have a right of action to seek enforcement of an obligation imposed by a charge or
condition to which a donation is subjected").
150. If an initial assignee chosen by the settlor has died pending administration of the settlor's
estate, a court might permit the settlor's personal representative to choose a new assignee. Cf supra
note 126 and accompanying text (discussing possibility of reversion to settlor in the event initial as-
signee dies or becomes incapacitated during settlor's lifetime).
151. Chester, supra note 7, at 616-17.
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"court-appointed special administratrix."' 152 While Smithers involved a
restricted charitable gift rather than an express trust, its reasoning could be
applied in the trust context. 153
If the settlor's right of enforcement is assignable, and if, following
Smithers, the right may be exercised after death by the personal representa-
tive, then the logical conclusion is that the personal representative should
have a power of assignment equivalent to that of a jiving settlor. By con-
trast, courts could recognize the settlor's heirs or devisees as potential as-
signees but not as potential assignors. Should the settlor or her personal
representative designate the settlor's heirs or devisees as successors to the
§ 405(c) enforcement right, and provide reasonable notice to the trustee,
such a designation might be construed as a valid assignment to the heirs or
devisees. Allowing the heirs or devisees to make a subsequent assignment
to a third party, however, would violate the policy against successive as-
signments proposed above. 154
To the extent that the settlor anticipates the problem of postmortem
trust enforcement, an alternative possibility might be to appoint a "trust
protector" and grant that individual the right to enforce the trust. A trust
protector is "a person selected by the settlor to represent the settlor's inter-
ests in making specified trust decisions that the settlor will be unable to
make."'155 Trust protectors are authorized by the UTC.156 A settlor might
appoint a trust protector either to ensure that his wishes are carried out or to
protect the interests of the beneficiaries.157 By incorporating a concept that
first developed in the trust context, a settlor might try to circumvent some
of the more difficult questions raised by the application of contractual prin-
ciples. Selecting a trust protector would also avoid the problem of giving
notice to the trustee, as the settlor's choice of the protector mechanism
would be evident in the trust instrument.
Nevertheless, the law relating to trust protectors is also in an early
stage of development, and important questions, such as the identity of the
trust protector's principal, have not yet been fully answered by courts and
152. 723 N.Y.S.2d 426, 434 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001).
153. On the close parallel between charitable trusts and restricted charitable gifts, see supra note
17.
154. Seesupra notes 121-126.
155. Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV.
2761, 2763 (2006).
156. UTC § 808(b)-(d) (2000).
157. Jeffrey Evans Stake, A Brief Comment on Trust Protectors, 27 CARDOZO L. REv. 2813, 2818
(2006).
[Vol 85:31070
2010] SHOULD CHARITABLE TRUST ENFORCEMENT RIGHTS BE ASSIGNABLE? 1071
legislatures. 158 If the settlor is treated as the principal, any grant of powers
to a trust protector raises the traditional problem of the dead hand.159 More-
over, the possibility of naming a protector in the trust instrument would not
help a settlor who realized the importance of enforcement standing only
after creating the trust, as might have been the case in Hicks.
In the long run, a settlor's delegation of enforcement rights to a trust
protector may prove as problematic for courts as an assignment grounded
in contract. Given the potential difficulties associated with both options,
however, it may be sensible to permit postmortem assignability only as a
default rule that the settlor could override either in the trust instrument or
by subsequent notice to the trustee. Much of the law of trusts takes the form
of default rules that can be preempted by contrary provisions in the trust. 160
To the extent that mandatory rules of trust law interfere with the settlor's
purposes, they do so to limit the reach of the dead hand.161 Nevertheless,
existing mandatory rules already require charitable trusts to benefit the
community, 162 and a term of a trust precluding postmortem assignment of
the settlor's enforcement right would leave open existing mechanisms for
enforcement by the attorney general, cotrustees, and persons with a special
interest in the trust.163 The effect and presumptive purpose of UTC
§ 405(c) should be to further, not defeat, the intent of the settlor. 164 Accord-
ingly, a lifetime request by the settlor that the right of assignment not be
exercised after death ought to be respected.
CONCLUSION
The recent and widespread recognition of settlor standing in the chari-
table trust context opens the door to issues that have not hitherto been ex-
plored. At least with regard to the issue of assignability, courts applying
UTC § 405(c) and similar provisions need not write on a blank slate. In
cases like Hicks, a reasonable assignment of the settlor's enforcement right
158. See Gregory S. Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L.
REv. 2807, 2808 (2006). The UTC specifies that trust protectors are presumptively fiduciaries who owe
a duty "to act in good faith with regard to the purposes of the trust and the interests of the beneficiar-
ies." UTC § 808(d).
159. See Sterk, supra note 155, at 2763.
160. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 4 cmt. a(l) (2003); UTC § 105 cmt. (explaining that "the
Uniform Trust Code is primarily a default statute").
161. See John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105,
1107-19, 1126 (2004).
162. Seeid. at 1108-09.
163. See sources cited supra note 39.
164. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 10.1
(2003) ("The donor's intention is given effect to the maximum extent allowed by law.").
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could further the goal of effective supervision that was the original impetus
for settlor standing. Over time, a new body of trust law jurisprudence may
develop to deal with the problems raised by settlor standing. For now,
however, courts would make a good start by acknowledging existing law
relating to the assignment of contractual rights. On the one hand, while
assignment may not be appropriate in every case, recognizing a general
principle of assignability would serve the greater purpose of holding chari-
table trustees accountable for their actions. On the other hand, courts
should impose some restrictions on the right of assignment to ensure that
charitable trusts continue to serve a public purpose and to protect trustees
from undue exposure to potentially frivolous litigation. Thus, the answer to
the question posed in the title to this Article is a qualified "yes."
A charitable trust is obviously quite different from a contract to build
a house or purchase bushels of wheat, and law that is good for market
transactions may be less sensible when applied to gratuitous transfers. Nev-
ertheless, when faced with new and changing circumstances, courts should
not ignore basic principles of contract law that might have some utility in
the trust context. As Maitland wrote at the dawn of the last century, the
trust "is an 'institute' of great elasticity and generality; as elastic, as general
as contract." 165 So long as the trust remains a flexible institution, it will no
doubt remain a key instrument of philanthropy for centuries to come.
165. MAITLAND, supra note 68, at 23.
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